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TEMPTATION TO TAMPER: THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE
NBA’S ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY AND WHY THE
LEAGUE MAY BE FORCED TO TAKE
DRASTIC MEASURES TO FIX IT
“You don’t get free agents without it. [Tampering] is what the whole
league is built on.”1
I. WHO CARES ABOUT TAMPERING?
While recent trends might make it seem like player tampering
in professional sports is a new and emerging issue, its history can be
traced all the way back to the 1870s.2  Since then, anti-tampering
provisions have been implemented to prevent teams from recruit-
ing the top players on other teams while they are still under con-
tract and currently exist in every major professional sports league.3
These early provisions arose out of frustration by owners who lost
their players as a result of interference by other teams—a concern
that is just as relevant now as it was in the past.4  In the National
Basketball Association (“NBA,” or “the League”) however, player
tampering is running rampant, and the League’s anti-tampering
policy is not effective in preventing illegal recruiting.5  Ultimately,
the NBA would be well within its legal rights to more strictly en-
1. See Ric Bucher, NBA Tampering 101: ‘If You’re Not Cheating . . . You’re Not
Trying’, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2731438-nba-tampering-101-if-youre-not-cheating-youre-not-trying [https://perma
.cc/78MG-EVJC] (quoting anonymous NBA general manager regarding state of
player tampering).
2. See Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, 1-2016-1 Antitrust Report 1–II (MB
2016) (referencing first anti-tampering rules sports league implemented after
baseball club coaxed star baseball player away from his team).
3. See id. (tracing history of anti-tampering policies in sports from their early
beginnings to present day).
4. See id. (listing early historical reasons for these provisions); see also Ohm
Youngmisuk & Bobby Marks, How Will Tampering Charges Against the Lakers Proceed?,
ESPN (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/20402343/2017-
nba-tampering-faq [https://perma.cc/UF78-86NR] (providing answers to fre-
quently asked questions regarding recent and historical examples of player tam-
pering in NBA).
5. See Dave McMenamin et al., NBA Punishes Lakers for Tampering but Has a
History of Letting Players Slide, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nba/
story/_/id/20445869/nba-player-player-tampering-new-nba [https://perma.cc/
J9QS-Z933] (describing circumstances of Los Angelas Lakers’ fine in contrast to
common types of tampering).  For further discussion of several examples of illegal
tampering in the NBA where the League has decided against enforcement as mat-
ter of policy, see infra note 111 and accompanying text. R
(403)
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force this policy and would have no excuses not to if it is truly as
serious about preventing tampering as it claims to be.6  While anti-
trust laws normally prohibit restrictions of trade, the NBA’s anti-
tampering policy fits several exceptions to these laws that would al-
low the League to prevent teams from negotiating with players
under contract with other teams.7  After an examination of these
exceptions through the context of the anti-tampering provisions in
the NBA Constitution, it becomes clear that the League is within its
legal right to regulate and prohibit tampering.8  However, the
League’s lack of enforcement and pattern of inaction coupled with
emerging trends in technology and player relations have allowed
tampering to become a systemic problem in the League.9 This
Comment argues NBA Commissioner Adam Silver should use his
powers to resolve these concerns.10
Anti-tampering policies in professional sports leagues are nec-
essary for a number of reasons, such as maintaining a competitive
balance among each of the teams in a league when it comes to their
ability to sign players.11  Without such provisions, less desirable
franchises would be vulnerable to more prestigious and better posi-
tioned teams in highly marketable cities that could actively compete
for the services of these teams’ players while they are still under
contract.12  Allowing this to happen could be problematic in several
6. See Why the NFL Says There’s No Crying ‘Antitrust!’ in Football, PEPPERLAW: COM-
PETITION NEWS (May 16, 2011), https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/why-
the-nfl-says-theres-no-crying-antitrust-in-football-2011-05-16/ [https://perma.cc/
RLU6-Z8TB] (examining antitrust in relation to NFL lockout).  For further discus-
sion of reasons why NBA’s anti-tampering policy does not violate antitrust laws and
thus legally allows the League to prevent teams and players from recruiting players
who are under contract with other teams, see infra note 63 and accompanying text. R
7. For further discussion of impact of antitrust laws and applicable exceptions
in context of sports leagues, see infra notes 35–47 and accompanying text. R
8. For further discussion of how antitrust laws can be applied to the NBA’s
anti-tampering policy, see infra notes 48–81 and accompanying text. R
9. For further discussion of the history and prevalence of tampering in the
NBA and problems it causes, see infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text. R
10. For further discussion of how Adam Silver can use his powers as Commis-
sioner to curtail the League’s tampering problem, see infra notes 169–210 and R
accompanying text.
11. See Jack Andrade, What Is Tampering and Why Does the NFL Care About It?,
BOSTON.COM (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.boston.com/sports/new-england-patri-
ots/2015/03/25/what-is-tampering-and-why-does-the-nfl-care-about-it (“Why does
the NFL take tampering so seriously? In layman’s terms, because tampering has
the potential to create an uneven playing field when it comes to acquiring
players.”).
12. See Dwight Jaynes, The Lakers Got Off Way Too Easy on That Tampering
Charge, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 1, 2017, 6:51 AM), https://www.nbcsports.com/north-
west/portland-trail-blazers/lakers-got-way-too-easy-tampering-charge [https://per
ma.cc/J6YY-HYPL] (stating that Los Angeles Lakers have been repeat offenders of
2
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ways.13  High profile examples of tampering could damage the rep-
utation of a sports league if fans and the media are repeatedly ex-
posed to team officials trying to coax players away from opposing
teams.14  Additionally, implementing and enforcing anti-tampering
provisions can act as a deterrent to teams planning on engaging in
such recruiting methods.15  Adding clarity to the limitations of
team’s recruiting abilities can also serve to put players on notice of
activities which could potentially result in sanctions.16
Another concern with allowing teams to negotiate with players
under contract with other teams is that the negotiations may serve
as a distraction which could negatively impact players’ perform-
ances with their current teams.17  This could lead to situations
where players actively playing for one team are forced to compro-
mise their current team to get a bigger upcoming pay day or to put
their future team in a better position to win.18  Though it did not
involve any known tampering, Carmelo Anthony’s 2011 incident
when he forced his way into a trade when the Denver Nuggets sent
him to the New York Knicks exemplifies a player’s focus on his next
this rule to detriment of other less valuable teams); see also Eric Reefe, What Will It
Take For Small-Market NBA Teams to Be Heard, SPORTS RETRIEVER (Nov. 30, 2018),
http://sportsretriever.com/basketball/will-take-small-market-nba-teams-heard/
[https://perma.cc/PM86-LAXC ] (“[D]ue to the fact that big-market teams can
offer them so much more in terms of branding, exposure, media hype, and even
endorsement deals, there’s always the fear that [players from small market teams]
might pack their bags and bounce to the big city when their contracts are up.  It all
comes down to opportunity, and if these players feel they can get a better one in a
bigger market, what’s to stop them from going?”); Adrian Wojnarowski, Small-Mar-
ket GMs Upset NBA Won’t Enforce Tampering Rules, ESPN (Dec. 21, 2018), http://
www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25587459/small-market-gms-upset-lebron-james-
pitch-anthony-davis [https://perma.cc/KK2L-RXVQ] (expressing concerns that
League’s inaction on LeBron James’ tampering has led to “open season on small
markets and [their] players”).
13. See James T. Gray, Sports Law Practice §?2.13 (MB 2017) (explaining three
main reasons why enforcement of anti-tampering rules is necessary).
14. See id. (stating that these policies help “preserve a positive public image of
professional sports”).
15. See id. (reasoning that by clarifying type of detrimental conduct that would
result in tampering violation, teams would avoid these practices to avoid punish-
ment by League).
16. See id. (explaining that players may be warier of engaging with teams who
could be acting in violation of these rules).
17. See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 2 (“An employee under contract may lose R
focus on performing his obligations to his current employer, turning his attention
to discussions taking place with a prospective employer.  The loss of focus at issue
here is not deliberate, but the inevitable byproduct of an alternative, time-consum-
ing activity.”).
18. See id. (stating that athletes may be incentivized to act to detriment of
their current team for benefit of team they wish to join in future, and that risk
heightened in sports leagues because one team’s failure can directly correlate to
another team’s success).
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contract harming his current team.19  This move ultimately left
both teams worse off, in retrospect.20  The same impact is evident in
the most recent NBA season with the Lakers because the team’s
performance on the court was apparently been hindered by off-
court speculation about LeBron James unsuccessfully trying to have
his teammates traded for New Orleans Pelicans star Anthony
Davis.21
With the importance of anti-tampering provisions in mind, the
NBA must be aware of several legal concerns to ensure it is doing all
it can to prevent tampering.22  The biggest challenge to the legality
of such provisions is the Sherman Antitrust Act, which Congress en-
acted to prevent the restraint of trade or monopolization of com-
merce.23  Any law or contract that creates an anticompetitive
agreement or monopolization of a market is subject to scrutiny
under the Sherman Act.24
To date, courts have yet to evaluate the tampering issue in the
context of antitrust law, and the overall topic remains unsettled.25
However, antitrust principles and exceptions such as the “rule of
19. See Terry Pluto, Carmelo Anthony Fiasco Could Be Worse Than What LeBron
James Did to the Cleveland Cavaliers, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www
.cleveland.com/pluto/blog/index.ssf/2011/01/carmelo_anthony_fiasco_could_b
.html [https://perma.cc/T74M-QEAC] (explaining that Anthony would be better
positioned if he was traded to Knicks immediately instead of waiting to sign in
offseason because new CBA would lead to lower maximum salary).
20. See Harvey Araton, Carmelo Anthony: How Much Was He to Blame for Trouble
With The Knicks?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/
24/sports/basketball/carmelo-anthony-new-york-knicks.html [https://perma.cc/
ZFQ2-8MJL] (evaluating Anthony trade and his disappointing impact on Knicks
more than six seasons later).
21. See Des Bieler, LeBron James Can Only Blame His Teammates So Much After
Another Bad Lakers Loss, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/sports/2019/02/26/lebron-james-can-only-blame-teammates-so-much-after-
another-bad-lakers-loss/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b5f229d70b5a [https://per
ma.cc/UUN3-TQ54] (noting that James “killed [the Lakers] chemistry” through
his attempts to acquire Davis).
22. See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 2, at 1–III (examining effects of antitrust R
laws on sports tampering provisions).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (making it illegal to restrict or monopolize or
conspire to restrict or monopolize trade); see also State of Mo. v. Nat’l Org. for Women,
Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1304–05 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The 50th and 51st Congresses were
primarily concerned with business trusts and the economic power which those
trusts possessed. . . . Clearly, by prohibiting trusts, the Congress sought to achieve
the preservation of free and fair competition.”).
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (forbidding anticompetitive agreements in restraint
of trade).
25. See Lewis Kurlantzick, The Tampering Prohibition and Agreements Between
American and Foreign Sports Leagues, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 293 (2009) (“No
American court has evaluated the antitrust status of a no tampering rule in an
inquiry focusing on this practice alone.”).
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reason” and the “nonstatutory labor exemption” can be applied to
the realm of sports leagues.26  The “rule of reason” is a cornerstone
of antitrust law, and stands for the principle that, in order to be
illegal, a restriction must go beyond simply regulating competition
and instead must “suppress” or “destroy” it.27  Additionally, the
“nonstatutory labor exemption” is most frequently applied to pro-
fessional sports leagues, allowing leagues and players to collectively
bargain free from anticompetitive guidelines that would otherwise
be considered a violation of antitrust laws.28
This Comment examines the NBA’s current anti-tampering
policy as it is presently enforced and assesses steps the League can
take to diminish the pervasiveness of tampering.29  Section II pro-
vides legal background for antitrust laws concerning anti-tampering
restrictions, including the Sherman Act, the rule of reason, and the
nonstatutory labor exemption.30  Section III explains the NBA rules
regarding tampering and chronicles the League’s enforcement pat-
terns when violations have occurred.31  Section IV examines the
NBA’s stance on tampering and analyzes how its shortcomings in
policy enforcement have led to a systemic player tampering prob-
lem throughout the League.32 Section V offers solutions for the
NBA to reverse the upward trend in tampering and analyzes the
legality and impact of such actions.33  Finally, Section VI concludes
the discussion by reiterating the main concerns facing the NBA and
summarizing the possible solutions at its disposal.34
26. For further discussion, introduction, and definition of the rule of reason
and nonstatutory labor exemption for antitrust law, see infra notes 27 and 63 and R
accompanying text.
27. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (an-
nouncing rule of reason for first time and defining its applicability).
28. For further discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption and its appli-
cability in context of professional sports, see infra notes 63–69 and accompanying R
text.
29. For further discussion of the current pattern of enforcement and pro-
posed solutions, see infra notes 92–133 and notes 178–189 and accompanying text. R
30. For further discussion of antitrust laws and their applicability to sports
anti-tampering rules, see infra notes 35–81 and accompanying text. R
31. For further discussion of the history of tampering in the NBA and how the
League has enforced the policy, see infra notes 82–133 and accompanying text. R
32. For further discussion of the widespread permeation of tampering in the
NBA, see infra notes 134–157 and accompanying text. R
33. For further discussion of how the NBA can resolve its tampering problem
and legal implications of such resolutions, see infra notes 158–218 and accompany- R
ing text.
34. For further discussion of the practical and legal concerns facing the
League and how to resolve them, see infra notes 219–235 and accompanying text. R
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II. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS AND GUIDELINES RELATING TO SPORTS
ANTI-TAMPERING PROVISIONS
A. Concerns with Antitrust Laws
The Sherman Antitrust Act makes it illegal to have laws or con-
tracts that place restraints on competition.35  Congress enacted the
Sherman Act, the first and most important federal antitrust law, in
1890.36
Section 1 provides “Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby de-
clared to be illegal.”37
Section 2 provides “Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony . . . .”38
There are three elements needed to prove a violation of the
Sherman Act: (1) a concerted action to (2) restrain trade, that (3)
affects interstate or foreign commerce.39  On their faces, sports
anti-tampering policies meet these criteria, as they are express
agreements among the teams that prohibit players from negotiating
with other teams, and the market is spread out among the states
and, in some cases, countries.40  However, Supreme Court jurispru-
dence indicates that only unreasonable restraints on trade are pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act, leaving the door open for sports
tampering policies to fit into one of several exceptions to the Act.41
One could argue that anti-tampering policies are a collective
agreement to limit trade, making Section 1 of the Sherman Act ap-
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (deeming it illegal to restrict or monopolize any part
of trade or commerce).
36. Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (laying out illegality of anticompetitive contracts).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (portraying monopolies as illegal).
39. See Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman
Act, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 125, 128 (2002) (listing three elements).
40. See id. at 131 (explaining each individual team in sports leagues must work
together to create more profitable entity, including agreeing to restrict trade for
betterment of league).
41. See id. at 144 (“For the most part, however, the courts have recognized
that the sports business is unique because of the need for off-the field cooperation
to enhance on-the-field competition.”).  For further discussion of the “rule of rea-
son” and “nonstatutory labor exemption,” see infra notes 50 and 63 and accompa- R
nying text.
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol26/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 7 15-MAY-19 13:28
2019] TEMPTATION TO TAMPER 409
plicable.42  Therefore, the structure of a league must be examined
to determine if it is even subject to Section 1.43  If leagues were
viewed as a single entity rather than a collection of individually run
organizations, Section 1 would not be applicable.44  However,
under North American Soccer League v. National Football League,45
sports leagues are determined to be made up of individual teams,
each driven by their own independent economic goals and capable
of making their own separate financial decisions, that are in direct
competition with one another.46  As such, the NBA is not seen as a
single entity, but rather a collection of individual actors conspiring
in the marketplace, thus taking it firmly into the realm of antitrust
laws.47
By their very nature, anti-tampering provisions restrict the abil-
ity of players to contract their labor with an organization in search
of their services, which stands directly at odds with the literal lan-
guage of the statute.48  At its core, the League’s decision to disallow
teams from negotiating for the services of players under contract
with another team amounts to a promise by competing organiza-
tions not to pursue one another’s employees.49  Under the “rule of
reason,” however, separate entities may be permitted to collectively
determine restrictions on inter-organization competition if they are
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (stating that it is illegal for actors to conspire to restrict
commerce).
43. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196 (2010)
(examining whether NFL was to be seen as one individual league or if each indi-
vidual team with independent economic motivations, noting that if League was to
be seen as separate entities “capable of conspiring,” it may be subject to § 1 of
Sherman Act).
44. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape
Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 735 (2010) (“As a single entity, a professional sports
league and its independently owned franchises would obtain a complete exemp-
tion from [S]ection 1.”).
45. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
46. See id. at 1252 (“Although NFL members thus participate jointly in many
of the operations conducted by it on their behalf, each member is a separately
owned, discrete legal entity which does not share its expenses, capital expenditures
or profits with other members.  Each also derives separate revenues from certain
lesser sources . . . .”).
47. See e.g., Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 200 (declaring that actions of thirty-two
individual NFL teams are covered by § 1); see also Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP
Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying American Needle’s holding to
other sports leagues including NBA).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
49. See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 2, at 1–IV (stating that “an agreement R
among competitors not to solicit each other’s employees is potentially a violation
of the antitrust laws”).
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pursuing a collective goal.50  Therefore, under the rule of reason,
the NBA is considered a “joint venture,” where the individual teams
act collectively to combine their money, skill, and knowledge for
the collective benefit of the association.51
With respect to anti-tampering policies within the NBA specifi-
cally, while the provisions do regulate competition among the
teams, they do not go far enough to suppress it.52  Rather than sup-
press competition, these provisions are designed to promote com-
petitiveness and balance among the teams to give each franchise
the best chance to assemble the strongest team it can, thereby giv-
ing it the best chance to win.53  As such, the purpose of the policy is
not only reasonable, but it is necessary.54  Here, because each team
is an individual actor pursuing its own economic and competitive
success, and the teams are in a constant state of competition against
one another, there are compelling reasons for the teams to prevent
other teams from tampering with their players.55  Under this the-
ory, the NBA’s anti-tampering policy would be very likely to survive
a rule of reason analysis.56
50. See Ariz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982) (allowing
seperate entities to pursue joint venture when “persons who would otherwise be
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportuni-
ties for profit. In such joint ventures, the partnership is regarded as a single firm
competing with other sellers in the market”); see also Blair & Lopatka, supra note 2, R
at 1–IV (“Restraints on competitive behavior among members of a productive joint
venture that plausibly enhance its value are judged under the rule of reason.”).
51. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures § 1 (2006) (“[A] joint venture has been
generally defined as an association of two or more persons formed to carry out a
single business enterprise for profit for which purpose they combine their prop-
erty, money, efforts, skill, time, and/or knowledge.”).
52. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
art. 35(e), 35A(e)–(f) (2012), available at https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/files/
221035054-nba-constitution-and-by-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BX-7K3H] (ex-
plaining that anyone who is charged with tampering must be provided chance to
respond to charges and plead case to commissioner).
53. See Andrade, supra note 11 (noting that league policy for NFL rule pro- R
vides justification for tampering provision, which is to protect teams during negoti-
ation process and to fairly acquire and retain services of their players).
54. See id. (stating that policy “allow[s] the intra-League competitive systems
devised for the acquisition and retention of player talent . . . to operate
efficiently”).
55. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203 (stating that when restrictions on competi-
tion are necessary, rule of reason is applicable for judging restraints).
56. See Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238 (“Every agreement concerning
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very es-
sence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.”).
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Another potentially relevant statute is the Clayton Act, which
Congress enacted in 1914 to provide further clarification on the
Sherman Act of 1890.57  The Clayton Act states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce.  Nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, insti-
tuted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having cap-
ital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or con-
strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade, under the antitrust laws.58
The Clayton Act’s declaration that human labor is not a com-
modity appears to apply specifically to the realm of professional
sports.59  Anti-tampering policies restrain the ability of teams to ne-
gotiate for the labor of players on opposing teams, thus a challenge
to the legitimacy of the policy would necessarily be a challenge to
the regulation of labor of human beings.60  Such a challenge would
fail under the plain language of the statute because regulation of
human labor is not a commodity that can be prohibited under the
Clayton Act.61  The text of the Clayton Act strongly indicates that
the Sherman Act did not intend to include simple negotiations of
labor, such as sports anti-tampering regulations, as part of its bar on
restraint of trade.62
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914) (declaring human labor not commodity or arti-
cle of commerce).
58. Id.
59. See Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special
Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 26–27 (1986) (arguing
that while rarely considered by courts in such context, text of Clayton Act seems to
be applicable to sports leagues).
60. See id. at 27 (“If a player practice is challenged solely on the ground that it
restrains competition in the employment of players, the challenge is necessarily
founded on the claim that antitrust law proscribes restraints on competition for
the labor of human beings—that is, restraints on the labor market.”).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (stating that antitrust laws do not make regulation of
human labor illegal).
62. See Roberts, supra note 59, at 27–28 (explaining that application of Clay- R
ton Act to sports leagues seems “inescapable” due to unique nature of sports and
need for competitive balance, though rarely has been applied).
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B. National Basketball Ass’n v. Williams and the Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption
In addition to having a high probability of surviving rule of
reason scrutiny, the NBA’s anti-tampering restrictions fall under an
exception that removes them from the scope of antitrust laws: the
nonstatutory labor exemption.63  One of the definitive case involv-
ing this nonstatutory exemption in the world of sports is National
Basketball Ass’n v. Williams.64  In Williams, the National Basketball
Players Association (“NBPA”) sought relief against the NBA, argu-
ing that three provisions in the previous collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) constituted a violation of antitrust laws.65  In
the eyes of the NBPA, these requirements amounted to “naked re-
straints between competitors,” designed to suppress and extinguish
the bargaining power of the players.66  The NBPA premised its ar-
gument on the theory that the cartel-like actions by the teams in
enforcing these rules violated the Sherman Act.67  Conversely, the
NBA maintained that the provisions at issue were not subject to an-
titrust scrutiny and instead were permitted based on the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption.68  The Second Circuit agreed with the NBA’s
assertion, relying on past history and congressional decisions indic-
ative of a legislative intent to keep collective bargaining out of the
scope of antitrust laws.69
The Second Circuit explained that multiemployer bargaining
has long been a staple of labor relations in the United States, even
63. See Why the NFL Says There’s No Crying ‘Antitrust!’ in Football, PEPPERLAW:
COMPETITION NEWS (May 16, 2011), https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/
why-the-nfl-says-theres-no-crying-antitrust-in-football-2011-05-16/ [https://perma
.cc/J35V-EFA8] (noting “nonstatutory labor exemption” is typically applied in con-
text of sports that allows collective bargaining between players associations and
leagues to negotiate mandatory terms which may limit and restrict competition for
wages and other conditions).
64. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding antitrust laws do not limit NBA’s ability to jointly bargain with Players
Association).
65. See id. at 685–86 (challenging draft system, revenue sharing and salary
cap, and “Right of First Refusal”).
66. See id. at 687 (claiming that “they prevent competition; they fix prices;
they suppress salaries”).
67. See id. (detailing concerns that any team who opposed “the cartel’s rules”
would be subject to potentially damaging punishment).
68. See id. at 688 (arguing that antitrust claim is eclipsed by rules of collective
bargaining).
69. See id. (concluding that “[r]elevant legal authority . . . strongly suggests
that the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers from acting jointly in bargaining
with a common union”).
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dating back to the days before the Sherman Act’s passage in 1890.70
To the Second Circuit, the NBA’s CBA agreement was, and still is, a
form of multiemployer bargaining, in which the individual teams
work in unison with one another to negotiate common terms
against a union of the players.71  Collective bargaining serves a cru-
cial role in these negotiations because it allows employers to remain
united in their terms rather than allow unions to attack employers
individually and take them out one by one.72  Collective bargaining
also lowers the costs of negotiating by reducing the overall number
of separate negotiations.73
Further, multiemployer bargaining serves the additional role
of leveling the playing field and eradicating potential competitive
disadvantages from differing terms among employers, a concern
that has an increased level of importance in the context of sports.74
Without collective bargaining, each individual team would be able
to negotiate under its own separate set of rules, creating a lack of
uniformity that would tear at the entire fabric of the League.75  As
such, sports leagues such as the NBA have a special need for mul-
tiemployer bargaining.76
The Second Circuit also explained that multiemployer bargain-
ing would not succeed unless the employers were permitted to cre-
ate a set of collective base of ground rules.77  This practice has been
in existence for over a century in the United States, but Congress
has never taken any action to prevent multiemployer bargaining,
and no challenge to its legality has ever succeeded.78  For the afore-
70. See id. at 688–89 (detailing importance and longevity of multiemployer
bargaining, which impacts millions of today’s employees).
71. See id. at 688 (stating that multiemployer bargaining takes place when
group of employers mutually agree to “act as a single entity” to negotiate with
union or unions of their employees).
72. See id. (explaining tactics used by unions to coerce employers into ac-
cepting uneven terms).
73. See id. at 688–89 (showing that without competitive bargaining, employers
would have to negotiate individually with employees, significantly multiplying cost
of negotiating).
74. See id. at 688 (explaining that having different terms for each employer
would create unbalanced competitive advantage during negotiations).
75. See id. at 689 (detailing unique importance of uniformity in sports indus-
try and need for common rules throughout league).
76. See id. (“Unlike the industrial context in which many work rules can differ
from employer to employer—even though a roughly common bottom line is desir-
able—sports leagues need many common rules.”).
77. See id. (noting that “essence of multiemployer bargaining” was ability to
form united front when negotiating with unions).
78. See id. at 689–90 (examining history of legislative action indicating con-
gressional support for practice of multiemployer bargaining, which court relied on
in determining that no violation had occurred).
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mentioned reasons, the court held that multiemployer collective
bargaining was not a violation of antitrust laws, thus falling under
the nonstatutory labor exemption.79  The court’s holding in Wil-
liams makes it clear that the NBA’s anti-tampering policy does not
violate antitrust laws because the policy is included in the League’s
CBA.80  Thus, as long as the League can show that it conducted the
collective bargaining negotiations in good faith, no antitrust viola-
tion exists.81
III. THE HISTORY OF ILLEGAL TAMPERING IN THE NBA
Having determined that the League’s policy does not violate
any antitrust laws, it is next possible to examine the policy in its
current form and dive deeper into the reasons for its perceived in-
effectiveness.82  Player tampering has been prevalent in the NBA
for a long time, but many believe that in recent years tampering has
spiraled out of control.83  Commissioner Adam Silver’s increasingly
lenient enforcement of tampering violations is a main catalyst for
this rise in tampering.84
A. What Counts as Tampering?
The NBA lays out its tampering policy in Sections 35 and 35A
of the NBA Constitution.85  An NBA player tampers when the
player attempts to convince or suggest to another player (or any
other League employee), who is under contract with a different
79. See id. at 693 (finding in favor of appellee NBA teams, holding that provi-
sions of CBA at issue did not constitute violation of antitrust laws).
80. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. XLII, Ex. A, §§ 5(d), (f)
(2017), available at http://3c90sm37lsaecdwtr32v9qof-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FWE-7PZG] (including section requiring NBA players to
abide by league’s tampering policy in uniform player contract, which is fundamen-
tal part of CBA).
81. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 691 (requiring that employer’s negotiations with
employees and unions take place in good faith).
82. See id. at 88 (concluding “[r]elevant legal authority, including importantly
the lack thereof, strongly suggests that the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers
from acting jointly in bargaining with a common union”).
83. See Bucher, supra note 1 (showing changing attitudes about tactics utilized R
by some executives around NBA).
84. See Jaynes, supra note 12 (examining recent punishments imposed by NBA R
in comparison to harsher penalties of past).
85. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
supra note 52, at art. 35(e), 35A(e)–(f) (governing any actions deemed to be mis- R
conduct by NBA players in art. 35A(e) and by non-players in art. 35A(e)–(f)).
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NBA team, to join another team.86  The same rules apply for
coaches, general managers, owners, and any other team official.87
In the event that an individual is found to have violated the anti-
tampering restrictions, the Commissioner of the NBA has sole dis-
cretion to impose sanctions.88  These sanctions include, but are not
limited to: fines, suspension, or both if the offender is a player, or
fines, suspension, the loss of future draft picks, and even forbidding
the offending team from negotiating with the employee with whom
illegal contact was made if the offender is a non-player.89  Further,
employees do not need to expressly try to convince another player
to join the team in order for the conduct to constitute illegal tam-
pering.90  The League has consistently found actions such as mak-
ing public comments about another team’s player or mentioning
players in promotional material to violate the anti-tampering
policy.91
86. See id. at art. 35(e) (making it violation for any player to “directly or indi-
rectly, entice[ ], induce[ ], or persuade[ ], any Player . . . or other person who is
under contract . . . to enter into negotiations for or relating to his services”).
87. See id. at art. 35A(e)–(f) (restricting same type of illegal conduct, with
only difference being maximum fine of $5,000,000 for non-players as opposed to
$50,000 fine for players who violate tampering rules).
88. See id. at art. 35(e), 35A(e)–(f) (stating that Commissioner shall decide if
violation occurred and shall hand down sanctions as they sees fit to violating
employee).
89. See id. (naming possible penalties Commissioner could impose).
90. See Christopher Reina, CBA Encyclopedia: Tampering, REALGM (June 29,
2017, 2:39 PM), https://basketball.realgm.com/article/246574/CBA-Encyclope-
dia-Tampering [https://perma.cc/XW62-UDCU] (noting that tampering can take
form of public or private contact with another team’s player, and covers everything
from more overt and blatant attempts to recruit players to seemingly innocuous
comments made by team officials).
91. See Kurt Helin, Adam Silver on Magic Johnson Tampering Fine: ‘Stop Talking
About Players on Other Teams’, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 15, 2018, 7:23 PM), https://
nba.nbcsports.com/2018/02/15/adam-silver-on-magic-johnson-tampering-fine-
stop-talking-about-players-on-other-teams/ [https://perma.cc/CF3J-WUPN] (re-
porting NBA Commissioner Adam Silver’s comments following his imposition of
sanctions on Lakers for violating tampering policy in which he makes it clear that
teams are not permitted to publicly make comments about other teams’ players);
see also Marcel Mutoni, Report: Bucks Owner Fined $25K for Tampering With Anthony
Davis, SLAM (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.slamonline.com/nba/report-bucks-
owner-fined-25k-tampering-anthony-davis/ [https://perma.cc/XK93-WQFX] (fin-
ing Milwaukee Bucks owner for commenting on rumors that Anthony Davis may
be considering Milwaukee as destination).
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B. How Prevalent is Player Tampering in the NBA?
1. Notable Examples of Tampering in the NBA Where the League Has
Imposed Sanctions
Due to its status as one of the most prestigious franchises in the
NBA, the Los Angeles Lakers have made several headlines in recent
years for alleged violations of the League’s anti-tampering policy.92
One of the most recent and high profile examples of player tamper-
ing in the NBA occurred when Magic Johnson commented that he
wanted to sign Paul George on the Jimmy Kimmel show.93  Magic
Johnson’s tampering is just an exclamation point at the end of a
long line of penalties that the League has imposed onto members
of teams’ front offices.94  In fact, the League fined the Lakers once
again shortly after the Jimmy Kimmel incident for comments that
Magic Johnson made publicly praising Giannis Antetokounmpo of
the Milwaukee Bucks, and the NBA later investigated Johnson for
communicating with Ben Simmons of the Philadelphia 76ers.95  An-
other recent example of tampering occurred in 2014 when the New
York Knicks team president, Phil Jackson, received a fine after he
suggested that retiring Oklahoma City Thunder point guard Derek
Fisher, a player he previously coached to five NBA championships,
92. See Dave McMenamin, Tampering or Fair Pursuit? ‘Things Get Blurry All the
Time’, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/20525040/
nba-fine-tampering-fact-life-nba [https://perma.cc/K5L7-9XMC] (reporting Lak-
ers were accused of tampering with upcoming free agent Paul George).
93. See id. (discussing League’s $500,000 fine on Lakers in 2017 after team
executive Magic Jonson mentioned, presumably jokingly, that Paul George should
“wink-wink” come and play for Lakers).
94. See Kristian Winfield, Magic Johnson Keeps Tampering, and He’s Really Bad at
Hiding It, SBNATION (Feb. 12, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/2019/
2/11/18220842/magic-johnson-tampering-la-lakers-history-ben-simmons-paul-
george-anthony-davis [https://perma.cc/26P6-B4NJ] (listing long history of Magic
Johnson’s tampering); see also Royce Young, Paul George Agrees with Thunder on 4-
Year, $137 Million Deal, ESPN (July 1, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/
id/23958531/paul-george-commits-re-sign-oklahoma-city-thunder [https://perma
.cc/DFS8-XEZ5] (reporting that despite Lakers recruiting efforts, George agreed
to re-sign with Thunder on four-year deal).
95. See Ohm Youngmisuk, NBA Fines Lakers $50K for Magic Johnson’s Comments
on Giannis Antetokounmpo, ESPN (June 20, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/
story/_/id/22347434/los-angeles-lakers-fined-50000-magic-johnson-violates-
league-anti-tampering-rule [https://perma.cc/C349-C7U4] (fining Lakers organi-
zation after Johnson stated that he thought Antetokounmpo would be future MVP
and would lead the Bucks to championship one day); see also Mike Rosenstein,
Sixers-Lakers Ben Simmons-Magic Johnson Tampering Investigation: NBA Releases Find-
ings (UPDATE), NJ.COM (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nj.com/sports/2019/02/
new-twist-to-sixers-lakers-ben-simmons-magic-johnson-saga-thanks-to-elton-brand
.html [https://perma.cc/6GE9-DK5D] (stating NBA investigated Johnson’s con-
tact with Simmons finding no violation).
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was potentially being targeted for the Knicks head coaching job.96
The League even went as far as to fine the Toronto Raptors after
rapper and team “global ambassador” Drake asked the crowd at his
Toronto concert to show the then Thunder star Kevin Durant, who
was in attendance, what it would be like for him to play for the
Raptors.97
Tampering is so commonplace throughout the NBA that the
League handed down three different tampering sanctions in 2013,
on the same day, determining that the Houston Rockets, Atlanta
Hawks, and Sacramento Kings all violated League rules.98  The
Hawks sent out an email to their season ticket holders referencing
the potential for the team to sign future big name free agents such
as Chris Paul and Dwight Howard.99  The Kings received a fine be-
cause head coach Mike Malone mentioned that he thought Chris
Paul would look good wearing a Sacramento Kings uniform.100  The
Rockets’ fine resulted from a series of free agency preview articles
posted on the team’s official website hinting at potential acquisi-
tions for the upcoming free agency period.101  Television star and
owner of the Dallas Mavericks, Mark Cuban, also received fines on
two different occasions for tampering violations.102 Cuban’s first
96. See Marc Stein, Knicks Phil Jackson Fined $25K, ESPN (June 4, 2014), http:/
/www.espn.com/new-york/nba/story/_/id/11022158/phil-jackson-new-york-
knicks-fined-tampering-derek-fisher-oklahoma-city-thunder [https://perma.cc/
FK7M-V3PF] (finding Jackson’s comments to violate League’s tampering guide-
lines and noting that Jackson himself remained “undaunted” by fine).
97. See Marc Stein, Sources: NBA Fines Raptors $25K, ABC NEWS (Aug. 17,
2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/sources-nba-fines-raptors-25k/story?id=24
932731 [https://perma.cc/9X7L-ME75] (noting that Drake’s statement caused
Toronto crowd to cheer and begin to chant Durant’s name).
98. See Sam Amick & Jeff Zillgitt, NBA Fines Three Teams for Tampering, USA
TODAY SPORTS (June 11, 2013, 4:59 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
nba/2013/06/10/nba-teams-filing-tampering-charges/2409499/ [https://perma
.cc/GRB9-BR9B] (reporting on internal memo quoting art. 35A of League Consti-
tution and explaining why teams’ actions resulted in sanctions).
99. See Youngmisuk & Marks, supra note 4 (indicating in email that fans R
should buy their season ticket packages early because they would not be available
after team made their signings).
100. See id. (making these comments during his introductory press confer-
ence as new coach of Sacramento Kings after having previously been assistant
coach of Paul in New Orleans).
101. See Patrick Harrel, Houston Rockets Fined by NBA for Free Agency Tampering,
THE DREAM SHAKE (June 10, 2013, 4:57 PM), https://www.thedreamshake.com/
2013/6/10/4416358/houston-rockets-tampering-fine-nba-free-agency [https://
perma.cc/Y2S4-H3RB] (stating that purpose of video was to highlight skills of po-
tential players that could help team and provide scouting report for those players
as opposed to attempting to persuade players listed to sign with team).
102. See Reina, supra note 90 (mentioning that despite these fines, Cuban has R
been proponent of stricter rules regarding player tampering).
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fine came in 2010 for making statements about the impending free
agency of superstar LeBron James, and his second violation oc-
curred in 2015 for openly speaking about negotiations with DeAn-
dre Jordan and Wesley Mathews during the free agent moratorium
period.103  The intent and nature of the comments are not relevant
factors in determining a statement about a player is tampering, as
evidenced by the League handing a fine to then Phoenix Suns gen-
eral manager (“GM”), Steve Kerr, for jokingly suggesting that he
would try to sign LeBron James for the League minimum salary.104
While the punishments the League handed down this decade
almost exclusively involve minor fines comparative to the overall
wealth of the infringing team, former Commissioner David Stern
imposed significantly harsher penalties on tampering violations in
the early part of his tenure.105  For example, in 1984, the Trailblaz-
ers received a fine of $250,000 for tampering violations, which was a
much more impactful sum for a team to pay in the 1980s when the
League was not as lucrative as it is today.106  An even more severe
penalty occurred in 1995 when the NBA forced the Miami Heat to
pay $1,000,000 to the New York Knicks and forfeit a first round
draft pick to the team for commenting on then Knicks head coach
Pat Riley.107  The harshest sanctions ever imposed for tampering
occurred in 2000 after the Minnesota Timberwolves reached a se-
cretive and illegal contract agreement with Joe Smith in an effort to
103. See id. (listing both of Cuban’s violations as well as many other violations
that occurred in recent history by other team executives around League).
104. See Nick Greene, The NBA Needs an Unlimited Data Plan, SLATE (Sept. 8,
2017, 11:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2017/09/tam-
pering_with_nba_players_should_be_totally_legal.html [https://perma.cc/6JHU-
QG7J] (highlighting absurd nature of Kerr’s comments, which were not intended
to be taken seriously or actually entice James to sign with team).
105. See Jaynes, supra note 12 (comparing recent fine imposed on Lakers for R
their infraction involving Paul George with other, more severe penalties League
imposed in past, as well as opining that new regime under Commissioner Silver is
much more lenient than that of former Commissioner David Stern).
106. See id. (noting that this violation was imposed because Trailblazers ex-
plained some of League’s financial rules to prospective draft picks Patrick Ewing
and Hakeem Olajuwon); see also Al Iannazonne, Outgoing NBA Commissioner David
Stern Transformed the League into a Powerhouse, NEWSDAY (Jan. 25, 2014, 4:58 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/sports/basketball/outgoing-nba-commissioner-david-
stern-transformed-the-league-into-a-powerhouse-1.6875661 [https://perma.cc/
E2HZ-C38L] (showing League revenue increased from $165 million in Stern’s first
year as commissioner in 1984 to $5.5 billion when he departed in 2014).
107. See Associated Press, Knicks Get $1 Million, No. 1 Pick for Riley, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-02/sports/sp-54426_1_pat-
riley [https://perma.cc/VC4X-SBYH] (forcing Heat to relinquish 1996 first round
pick, which was subsequently awarded to Knicks as compensation for Heat’s
interference).
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circumvent the League’s salary cap restrictions.108  Commissioner
Stern fined the Timberwolves organization $3.5 million, forced
them to forfeit five future first round draft picks, suspended the
team’s owner Glen Taylor and GM Kevin McHale, and declared
Smith’s contract void, making him a free agent.109
2. Player-to-Player Tampering That the League Has Permitted
Looking at the history of NBA tampering violations, a clear
trend emerges, as all of the violators were either coaches or team
executives.110  However, a much more common, yet much less pe-
nalized, version of tampering occurs when players attempt to re-
cruit other players to join together as teammates.111  When the
Miami Heat formed its “big three” in 2010, it was not a lucky break
that happened over night; rather, it was the culmination of years of
behind the scenes discussions between longtime friends LeBron
James, Dwayne Wade, and Chris Bosh, who had been thinking of
joining forces well before the 2010 free agency period.112  Despite
the League rules being quite clear in prohibiting players from at-
tempting to recruit employees under contract with other teams, the
League has essentially admitted its far more lenient stance when
the violators are players.113
Unlike some of the public comments from non-players that the
League has often penalized, player-to-player tampering can have an
108. See NBA Punishes Timberwolves for Secret Deal with Smith, NBA.COM (Oct. 25,
2000), https://www.nba.com/news/smith_wolves_001025.html [https://perma
.cc/7YXN-34P4] (reporting on punishment of Timberwolves by League and David
Stern).
109. See id. (noting Stern also voided Smith’s previous two contracts, thereby
negating his ability to sign larger contract with team in future, which arguably
stretched League’s authority beyond what was allowed at time).
110. See Reina, supra note 90 (listing several of above examples of penalized R
tampering, all of which were conducted by non-players).
111. See Dave McMenamin et al., NBA Punishes Lakers for Tampering but Has a
History of Letting Players Slide, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nba/
story/_/id/20445869/nba-player-player-tampering-new-nba [https://perma.cc/
NNV6-BYNL] (explaining that players recruiting other players is most common
form of tampering and has become “open secret” in today’s NBA).
112. See id. (reporting that these three future teammates had been discussing
opportunity of playing together on same team as far back as 2008 Olympics, when
they played together on Team USA).
113. See id. (“‘What we told the owners was that the three players are totally,
as our system has evolved, within their rights to talk to each other,’ then commis-
sioner David Stern said.  He added that players controlling their destinies by work-
ing together . . . ‘is not tampering or collusion that is prohibited.’”).
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actual, tangible impact on the landscape of the NBA.114  This real
life impact could be seen in full force in 2014, when LeBron James
called Kevin Love to discuss the prospect of playing together in
Cleveland, paving the way for the Cavaliers to make a trade to ac-
quire Love despite the Timberwolves star having a year left on his
contract.115  In fact, player-to-player tampering very likely changed
the entire landscape of the NBA in 2016 when Draymond Green,
just hours after losing in game seven of the NBA Finals, sent a text
to Kevin Durant telling him, “We need you. Make it happen.”116  If
this text from Green did, in fact, influence Durant’s decision to sign
with Golden State, the message will have sent ripples throughout
the entire League that will still be felt for foreseeable future.117  Fol-
lowing the signing of Durant, the Warriors won the next two con-
secutive NBA championships and appeared even stronger this year
than ever before.118  Yet despite the very real impact of player-to-
player tampering, and the openness in which players attempt to re-
cruit players on other teams, the League simply stands by and al-
lows it to continue without any repercussions.119  For example,
114. See id. (noting that lack of enforcement regarding player-to-player tam-
pering violations has created loophole where players can openly recruit players on
opposing teams, regardless of contract status).
115. See id. (claiming that once Cavaliers received word from James that Love
was interested in playing for Cleveland, they felt comfortable enough to trade their
first overall pick Andrew Wiggins to Minnesota in exchange for Love, with no sanc-
tions imposed against LeBron for role in recruiting Love).
116. See Michael McCann, The KD Text: Is Draymond Guilty of Tampering?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 27, 2017), https://www.si.com/nba/2017/06/27/war-
riors-thunder-nba-free-agency-kevin-durant-draymond-green-tampering [https://
perma.cc/387W-CY7Q] (explaining that for Durant to receive message from
Green so soon after losing in biggest game of his life let him know that Green and
Warriors were serious).
117. See Chris Herring, The Warriors’ Dynasty Is Different, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(June 9, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-warriors-dy-
nasty-is-different/ [https://perma.cc/Q6HZ-UJSH] (explaining that not only have
Warriors become dynasty with signing of Durant, who has won each of last two
Finals MVP awards, but also that they are possibly poised to become longest reign-
ing dynasty in modern NBA history and have assembled arguably greatest basket-
ball team of all time).
118. See Adrian Wojnarowski, DeMarcus Cousins Says Conversations with Warriors
Sealed Decision to Join, ESPN (July 3, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/
23980153/demarcus-cousins-agrees-join-golden-state-warriors-1-year-53-million-
deal [https://perma.cc/E9L3-NHBQ] (reporting that four time All-Star center
DeMarcus Cousins agreed to sign with reigning back-to-back champion Warriors
following conversations with former Olympic teammates Durant, Curry, and
Green, making them first team in over forty years to have five All-Stars from previ-
ous season on same team).
119. See McCann, supra note 116 (“While the league has fined teams and own- R
ers for violating the anti-tampering rule, it has usually shied away from punishing
players.”).
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when Isaiah Thomas was selected to play in the 2017 All-Star game,
he openly admitted that he attempted to recruit other All-Stars to
come to the Boston Celtics in the offseason, but he received no
consequences from the League for his actions.120  At the 2019 NBA
All-Star draft, team captain LeBron James joked that “[t]ampering
rules do not apply on All-Star Weekend” after selecting Anthony
Davis for his team.121
The current landscape of the NBA has made player-to-player
tampering an even bigger concern, as today’s players tend to be
friendlier with one another, and social media and new technologies
make public recruiting extremely easy.122  Social media recruiting
has become so commonplace among players that as soon as the
Cavaliers lost in the 2018 NBA finals, several players took to Twitter
or Instagram to try to lure LeBron James to their teams.123  Phila-
delphia 76ers superstar and notorious social media user Joel Em-
biid even went as far as to tweet at the NBA, likely jokingly, to ask if
his constant recruiting was legal, and the League still did not penal-
ize him.124  In addition to these examples, there are many more
instances in recent NBA history where a player has technically com-
120. See Adam Himmelsbach, Isaiah Thomas Did Some Recruiting During All-Star
Weekend, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/cel-
tics/2017/02/23/isaiah-thomas-did-some-recruiting-during-all-star-weekend/
HgaNfORFnlzOVpTykYFhaP/story.html [https://perma.cc/E4YQ-NKEC] (report-
ing of Thomas’s admission that he used event to recruit players and that he re-
ceived positive feedback from some players with whom he was in contact).
121. See Des Bieler, LeBron James Jokes About ‘Tampering’ After Picking Anthony
Davis in NBA All-Star Game Draft, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/sports/2019/02/08/lebron-james-jokes-about-tampering-after-
picking-anthony-davis-nba-all-star-game-draft/?utm_term=.29833ccd7239 [https://
perma.cc/J9C4-WV7P] (commenting on speculation that James tried to orches-
trate trade to acquire Davis on Lakers).
122. See Austin, Magic: I Wouldn’t Have Teamed up with Jordan and Bird, UPROXX
(July 21, 2010), https://uproxx.com/dimemag/magic-i-wouldnt-have-teamed-up-
with-jordan-and-bird/ [https://perma.cc/ST5B-RRTK] (quoting players from past
generations discussing differences in today’s NBA, stating they would not have
thought of trying to recruit other teams’ players to join forces).
123. See Charles Curtis, 6 NBA Players Already Recruiting LeBron James, USA TO-
DAY (June 11, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ftw/2018/
06/11/6-nba-players-already-recruiting-lebron-james-on-social-media/111174038/
[https://perma.cc/W4B3-9YYZ] (listing players such as Joel Embiid and Enes
Kanter, who posted tweets or photo-shopped pictures of LeBron in their teams’
jerseys in effort to make him consider their teams).
124. See Joel Embiid (@JoelEmbiid), TWITTER (July 3, 2014, 4:00 PM), https:/
/twitter.com/joelembiid/status/484834174830776320?lang=en [https://perma
.cc/2YXC-XBXK] (“I hope i’m not gonna get fined already with those Lebron’s
tweets is it legal to recruit over twitter @NBA?”).
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mitted tampering under the NBA Constitution but received no pen-
alty from the League.125
Throughout the entire history of the League, there appears to
be only one time where the NBA appears to have found a player
guilty of tampering with a player on another team.126  In 1999, Will
Perdue of the Chicago Bulls suggested that his former San Antonio
Spurs teammate Tim Duncan was “not married” to the Spurs.127
However, that was nearly twenty years ago, and the NBA has since
allowed similar behavior without any punishment.128  Such League
action demonstrating actual concern that Perdue’s comments
could persuade Duncan to join him in Chicago sits in stark contrast
with recent NBA trends.129  Had Perdue made those comments to-
day, the League likely would not have even batted an eye, as players
routinely get away with much more direct and open recruiting prac-
tices with opposing players.130
This season, the NBA imposed another rare penalty on a player
for tampering, fining Anthony Davis $50,000 for publicly requesting
a trade through his agent.131  While still seldom punished, this situ-
ation is different than other alleged tampering by players because
Davis’ comments dealt only with his own contract with the Pelicans,
and he did not attempt to recruit another player to New Orleans.132
In light of the colossal effects that player-to-player recruiting has
had on the NBA over the past decade, the League needs to take its
125. See McMenamin et al., supra note 111 (listing other notable times when R
players got away with tampering, including Chandler Parsons to DeAndre Jordan
and Damian Lillard and C.J. McCollum to Carmelo Anthony).
126. See McCann, supra note 116 (noting that only exception occurred in R
1999 when Will Perdue of Chicago Bulls made public comments about Spurs star
Tim Duncan).
127. See id. (indicating that Perdue could have been trying to persuade
Duncan to sign with Chicago and issuing warning to Perdue for remarks).
128. See id. (occurring in 1999, noting other subsequent actions have been
widely permitted by League).
129. See McMenamin et al., supra note 111 (comparing NBA’s history with R
recent decisions and showing intent by NBA to leave loophole open allowing play-
ers to recruit one another without committing violation).
130. For further discussion of recent recruiting attempts conducted by players
where the NBA has seemingly looked other way, see supra notes 115–125 and ac- R
companying text.
131. See Marc Stein, N.B.A. Fines Anthony Davis $50,000 After Agent’s Request for
a Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/
sports/anthony-davis-fine-trade.html [https://perma.cc/S7FL-9SRB] (reporting
fine after Davis’ agent went public with trade demand).
132. See id. (describing Davis’ agent’s comments as “intentional effort to un-
dermine the contractual relationship between Davis and the Pelicans”).
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own rules more seriously and begin to enforce them if it truly wants
to maintain a competitive balance in the NBA.133
IV. LEAGUE FAILURES THAT HAVE ESCALATED
THE TAMPERING PROBLEM
Despite its inconsistent history of enforcement, the NBA claims
to take the issue of tampering very seriously.134  While Adam Silver
may believe he is taking a hard stance and making an example out
of the Lakers to try to prevent tampering, his comments actually
reveal how in the dark he is about the League-wide scope of tam-
pering throughout the NBA.135  His belief that other teams are fol-
lowing the anti-tampering policy fails to recognize a simple truth
that is key to solving the NBA’s tampering problem: that everyone is
tampering, all the time.136  The League’s anti-tampering policy as it
is currently enforced is not effective, and the NBA must implement
a stricter enforcement of its policy if Commissioner Silver truly
wants to prevent tampering.137
A. Tampering Has Become Just Another Part of the League: Is
Adam Silver on the Wrong Side of an Uphill Battle?
Player tampering is not just a recent phenomenon that can eas-
ily be stopped; rather, it is a deeply rooted and systemic part of how
the entire League operates.138  Nearly every single person in an
NBA front office will admit that the League is built on tampering
and that the majority of successful player negotiations are techni-
cally violations of the anti-tampering policy.139  When delving
133. See Herring, supra note 117 (discussing potential of player-to-player tam- R
pering to reroute entire trajectory of NBA).
134. See Rachel Nichols, Adam Silver To Execs on Tampering: Stop Talking About
Players on Other Teams, REALGM (Feb. 16, 2018, 9:24 AM), https://basket-
ball.realgm.com/wiretap/248998/adam-silver-to-execs-on-tampering-stop-talking-
about-players-on-other-teams [https://perma.cc/N2CJ-P3ZV] (making it clear that
team executives are not permitted to talk about other teams’ players).
135. See id. (quoting Commissioner Silver saying “other teams seem to be able
to follow these rules” while explaining his recent fine on Lakers).
136. See McMenamin, supra note 92 (citing assistant coach as saying “I don’t R
know if it will ever stop” in reference to league-wide tampering).
137. See Bucher, supra note 1 (noting that “dirty little secret” of NBA is that R
“tampering occurs all the time”).
138. See id. (quoting one unnamed general manager as saying “[y]ou don’t
get free agents without it.  [Tampering] is what the whole league is built on.
That’s the only way you can get anything done”).
139. See id. (“‘If you’re not cheating by the letter of the law,’ says one former
GM, ‘you’re not trying.’”); see also Kevin O’Connor, Let’s Stop Pretending the NBA
Cares About Its Tampering Rules, THE RINGER (Aug. 21, 2017, 8:33 AM), https://www
.theringer.com/nba/2017/8/21/16177684/magic-johnson-nba-tampering-paul-
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deeper into the timeframe and circumstances of many free agent
signings, it becomes increasingly clear that teams and players
reached deals prior to the legal negotiation period.140  It is quite
common for reporters to announce free agency moves within mere
hours of the official opening of the free agency period, making it
all but impossible to realistically believe that the entirety of the con-
tract negotiations took place within the legal timeframe allowed
under League rules.141
It is evident that the policy as currently enforced is not effective
in preventing tampering, and has, at best, a microscopic deterrence
effect.142  Even after receiving two separate fines for previous trans-
gressions, Mark Cuban recently said that tampering in the NBA is
“just the way it works.”143  The lack of deterrence and complete dis-
regard for the rules can largely be traced back to two factors: the
emergence of modern day instant communication technology as
well as the League and Commissioner Silver’s insufficient enforce-
ment.144  If Silver thinks that the half a million dollar penalty he
imposed on the Lakers last summer was enough to put the rest of
the teams on notice not to tamper with players, he is sadly mis-
taken.145  If anything, GMs around the League will likely see the
fine as a slap on the wrist and will view it as an open invitation to
reach out to players even more than they currently are.146
george [https://perma.cc/J5S8-23FR] (“I don’t want to use the ‘T’ word—tamper-
ing—but we all don’t play by the rules when it comes to making deals”).
140. See Bucher, supra note 1 (emphasizing obviousness of these illegal negoti- R
ations based on short time frame between the start of free agency period and time
when agreement is announced).
141. See id. (“‘How many names flash across the ticker two hours after mid-
night saying they’ve agreed to a four-year, $64 million deal?’ he asks. ‘You think
that was negotiated in 10 minutes?’”).
142. See id. (quoting GM as saying penalties imposed by NBA have “zero
effect”).
143. See Greene, supra note 104 (referencing Cuban’s remarks sympathizing R
with Pacers after Paul George incident).
144. See Peter Sampson, Adam Silver and the NBA Have a Tampering Problem,
BLAZERS EDGE (Aug. 21, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.blazersedge.com/2017/8/
21/16177284/adam-silver-and-the-nba-have-a-tampering-problem-magic-johnson-
paul-george-pacers-lakers [https://perma.cc/6HVG-9FA9] (discussing differences
in player relationships in today’s NBA due to internet and its affect on amount of
tampering occurring).
145. See Bucher, supra note 1 (showing dismissive attitude GMs and agents R
have regarding anti-tampering policy).
146. See id. (“One prominent agent went even further.  Asked if it would serve
as any kind of deterrent, he laughed.  ‘Are you kidding me?  It might enhance it.
If it only costs $500,000 to take a shot at getting Paul George, I’d think every team
might try it.’”).
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B. The Cautionary Tale of Mitch Kupchak
By now, most people around the League have realized that it is
not only beneficial to break the rules, but that refusing to do so can
have serious negative consequences.147 An agent who waits all the
way until the start of free agency to begin discussing new deals for a
client would likely end up fired.148  While most GMs realized a long
time ago that they were subject to the same type of scrutiny, Mitch
Kupchak, former GM of the Los Angeles Lakers, refused to bend
the rules.149  Kupchak spent over thirty years in the Lakers’ front
office and seventeen years as the GM with sole control over player
personnel, but the organization eventually fired Kupchak after sev-
eral failed attempts at attracting big name free agents in recent
years.150  Kupchak was unwilling to compromise his integrity, even
though it resulted in free agents slipping through his, and the
Laker’s, fingertips.151
Though Kupchak’s unwavering commitment to the League’s
rulebook may have been noble, it was ultimately naive of him to
believe he could succeed while playing by the book in an era when
every other GM was capitalizing on the League’s leniency.152  In re-
cent years, the Lakers found themselves watching from a distance as
star after star signed elsewhere mere hours after Kupchak would
even pick up the phone to begin his negotiations.153  Not even the
prestige of the Lakers franchise and the allure of playing in Los
Angeles was enough to attract game changing free agents in this
new era of modern tampering, and without tampering, Kupchak’s
methods may well have crippled a lesser organization.154
147. See id. (explaining GMs and agents who waited to the official start of free
agency were putting themselves at major disadvantage when negotiating new
contracts).
148. See id. (“If you’re an agent and you wait until July 1 to find out what your
client’s options are, you’re going to get fired.  You’ll be sitting there while your
client’s options are falling off the table.”).
149. See O’Connor, supra note 139 (revealing Ramona Shelburne report that R
Kupchak was only GM in entire League who waited until free agency period offi-
cially began before starting negotiations with players).
150. See Bucher, supra note 1 (noting Kupchak’s long tenure with Lakers and R
his eventual departure from team in February of 2017).
151. See O’Connor, supra note 139 (reporting Kupchak would not start his R
negotiations early to recruit a franchise-changing superstar like Kevin Durant).
152. See id. (“When it came to free agency, Kupchak scribbled inside the lines
while everyone else was spray-painting on the walls, and Los Angeles suffered.”).
153. See id. (showing that Kupchak would wait until 12:01 AM on July 1st to
even contact stars such as Kevin Durant).
154. See id. (noting that perks of Lakers organization were likely enough to
keep Kupchak afloat much longer than he would have survived in another city).
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All of this came to a head in the infamous summer of 2016,
when the NBA’s salary cap skyrocketed and every team suddenly
was in a position to spend big on free agents.155  When Kupchak
began reaching out to players at 12:01 AM on July 1st he was al-
ready weeks behind every other team, leaving him with no choice
but to sign aging players to large, long-term contracts that clogged
up the Lakers salary cap space for the next four years.156  When the
Lakers eventually fired Kupchak they replaced him with Magic
Johnson and Rob Pelinka to do exactly what Kupchak could not do:
catch up with the rest of the NBA and get the Lakers back on
track.157
V. HOW THE LEAGUE CAN TAKE BACK CONTROL OVER
ITS TAMPERING PROBLEM
A. Shot Clock Running Down: Are Problems Looming
for the NBA?
While every GM around the League today has moved on from
the failed strategy of Kupchak, some front office members feel like
the cheating has gotten out of hand.158  Teams have figured out
that having a player act on behalf of the team to do the recruiting is
an easy way to avoid punishment and circumvent the system.159
Some executives are going as far as to coach players on other teams
on what to say to their current employers in order to get their teams
to trade or release them.160  Other GMs have begun offering play-
ers additional perks beyond those provided in their contracts, such
155. See Setrige Crawford, 2016 Is a Great Summer to Be a Mediocre Free Agent,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 19, 2016, 9:11 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
2016-is-a-great-summer-to-be-a-mediocre-nba-free-agent/ [https://perma.cc/6CS4-
UL8M] (showing effect monumental increase in salary cap had across League).
156. See Dan Feldman, Jeannie Buss Says She Didn’t Understand Why Lakers Signed
Luol Deng and Timofey Mosgov, NBC SPORTS (July 26, 2017, 9:46 PM), https://
nba.nbcsports.com/2017/07/26/jeannie-buss-says-she-didnt-understand-why-lak-
ers-signed-luol-deng-and-timofey-mozgov/ [https://perma.cc/FN7R-ZN2H] (not-
ing Lakers’ owner Jeannie Buss did not approve of Lakers giving big contracts to
Luol Deng and Timofey Mosgov in 2016, eventually leading her to fire Kupchak).
157. See O’Connor, supra note 139 (revealing Johnson’s relationship with R
NBA players and Pelinka’s ability to “tamper without getting caught”).
158. See Bucher, supra note 1 (“Some executives are upset that now, they say, R
select GMs are going directly to coveted players through their own players. It
seems the unwritten rules are being rewritten.”).
159. See id. (reporting that GMs are instructing their players to act as “part-
ner” in recruiting process to avoid punishment from League and get around
system).
160. See id. (discussing that teams are “basically providing them with How To
Piss Off Your General Manager for Dummies”).
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as buying them cars or even places to live.161  Many team officials
feel as though these practices are crossing a line that is harming the
League.162
Many of the same concerns that justify the legality of the anti-
tampering policy under the rule of reason approach are reemerg-
ing due to the League’s lack of enforcement.163  The competitive
balance throughout the League has gotten so out of hand that
Adam Silver recently admitted that a better system is needed to
combat the disparity.164  Commissioner Silver may be mistaken in
believing that the system itself is the problem; the true issue lies in
the lack of enforcement.165  By not implementing stronger deter-
rents to violating players and teams, Silver is passively allowing a
system that creates the very kind of consequences it was designed to
prevent.166  Fans, media members, and even team owners are be-
coming fed up, and the time has come for Commissioner Silver and
the NBA to fix the problems they have created.167
B. Last Second Shot: How the League Can Get Back on Track
In theory, the NBA’s anti-tampering policy is sufficient as it
stands, but  the problem is that the Commissioner has refused to
161. See id. (noting that some GMs find this practice to be “egregious” and
that players are now expecting to receive these types of under the table bonuses
during negotiations).
162. See id. (quoting a disgruntled scouting director as saying: “You can push
the limits and still respect the rules and your opponents”).
163. For further discussion of the rule of reason, including an explanation
that under rule of reason approach, anti-tampering policies can be justified by the
need to keep competitive balance among competing teams and need to maintain
positive image of League, see supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. R
164. See Chris Barnewell, Warriors’ Dominance Has Adam Silver Thinking NBA’s
Competitive Balance Could Be Better, CBS SPORTS (July 11, 2018), https://www.cbss-
ports.com/nba/news/warriors-dominance-has-adam-silver-thinking-nbas-competi-
tive-balance-could-be-better/ [https://perma.cc/767Q-LSQM] (showing Silver
trying to downplay disparity of talent in NBA but admitting that changes could be
made in order to improve balance of power).
165. For further discussion of ineffectiveness of policy as it is currently being
enforced, see supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text. R
166. See Sampson, supra note 144 (“I wouldn’t be surprised to see everything R
ramp up five-fold.  I wouldn’t expect to see the millions of small-market fans will-
ing to stay invested in the game, when LeBron James or Steph Curry starts openly
lobbying through the media for young players to abandon their current small-
market teams.  Doing so goes against the spirit of the new CBA rules that can keep
a player locked in with their original team for the first nine years of their career.”).
167. See Greene, supra note 104 (explaining extremely high frustration level R
required for NBA owner to complain to League office about tampering violation);
see also Jaynes, supra note 12 (showing annoyance felt by NBA reporters). R
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adequately punish offenders.168  The Joe Smith incident is the only
example in the history of the NBA’s policy in which the League
successfully deterred teams from tampering effectively.169  The
League saw this as an exceptionally egregious violation and re-
sponded with a punishment that actually had teeth: voiding the
contract between Smith and the Timberwolves.170  This not only
prevented future teams from employing similar tactics, but it also is
an instance when the NBA stayed within its anti-tampering rules to
do so.171  To truly solve the problem of tampering in the League,
the NBA must confront the sources of illegal conduct head-on or
risk serious consequences by kicking the can down the road and
doing nothing.172
While it is clear that simple fines are not enough of a deterrent
in today’s game, the NBA Constitution allows for three other solu-
tions that would go a long way towards solving the problem: suspen-
sions, taking away draft picks, and nullifying contracts.173
Currently, the League is well within its legal rights to forbid tam-
pered-with players from signing with the offending teams because it
is allowed under the CBA.174  If the League started implementing
this practice to prevent tampering, the initial response would be
heavily divisive throughout the League, and players as well as some
owners may even seek to remove that allowance in the next CBA.175
Under the Williams approach, the anti-tampering policy is legally
permitted mainly because both owners and players agreed on it
168. For further discussion of the problem of enforcement, see supra note
165 and accompanying text. R
169. For further discussion of the Joe Smith incident, see supra note 108–109 R
and accompanying text.
170. For further discussion of the agreement, which was nullified, see supra
note 108–109 and accompanying text. R
171. See Tim Bontemps, Tampering is the Norm in the NBA, and the League Is
Virtually Powerless to Stop It, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/08/24/tampering-is-the-norm-in-the-nba-
and-the-league-is-virtually-powerless-to-stop-it/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.279748
37a034 [https://perma.cc/C7PP-2GQK] (noting that this punishment “likely de-
terred other potential tampering cases”).  For further discussion of the Commis-
sioner’s ability to forbid teams from signing tampered with players under NBA
Constitution, see supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. R
172. See Sampson, supra note 144 (explaining that Commissioner Silver has R
three choices: start enforcing NBA Constitution’s rules, modify agreement, or ig-
nore it completely).
173. For further discussion of possible punishments that the Commissioner
can impose under NBA Constitution, see supra note 88 and accompanying text. R
174. For further discussion of the Commissioner’s potential actions, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text. R
175. See Bucher, supra note 1 (explaining most owners would rather take risk R
of losing player to tampering than have League begin to enforce its policy).
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during collective bargaining negotiations.176  Without the nonstatu-
tory labor exception in play, the practice would need to pass the
rule of reason analysis for the League to prevent players from sign-
ing with teams who have tampered with them.177
1. Best to Start Slow
Given how deeply rooted player tampering is in the NBA land-
scape, by suddenly coming out and nullifying agreements reached
through tampering, the League would create an unwanted culture
shock that would almost certainty lead to a revolt.178  A better solu-
tion to ease into the transition while still putting GMs on notice
would be for the Commissioner to use his Article 35A power to en-
force maximum fines rather than relatively insignificant ones and
to suspend violating executors.179  At the very least, this would get
the attention of frequent offenders around the League, and if that
still did not improve the situation, Silver could bring back a practice
occasionally employed by David Stern: taking away draft picks.180
Deterring players would be even easier because they currently re-
ceive no punishments, so any type of fine would serve as a dissuad-
ing factor, especially considering that the players do not have nearly
the amount of income that the franchises themselves have.181  The
final step, as a more extreme method than imposing harsher fines
and suspensions, would be nullifying any contacts resulting from
impermissible contact with a player and barring that team from
signing them in the future.182  While it is impossible to prevent all
176. For further discussion of how multiemployer bargaining is a longstand-
ing method of labor relations and provisions collectively bargained for that fall
under exception of antitrust laws, see supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
177. For further discussion of restrictions on competition, see supra notes
48–56. R
178. See Bucher, supra note 1 (revealing that most executives around League R
do not blow whistle on other executives because they do not want to be met with
same kind of scrutiny).
179. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
supra note 52, at art. 35A(e) (granting Commissioner power to impose fine up to R
$5,000,000 or suspend members who violate policy for definite or indefinite time).
180. See id. (allowing Commissioner to take away draft picks from violating
teams).  For further discussion of past examples where teams were forced to forfeit
draft picks due to tampering violations, see supra notes 105–107 and accompany- R
ing text.
181. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
supra note 52, at art. 35(e) (giving Commissioner power to impose fines on players R
who attempt to recruit players under contract with other teams).
182. See NBA Fines T-Wolves for Secret Deal, supra note 108 (discussing Joe Smith R
incident as example of successfully dissuading teams from trying to reach illegal
contracts by nullifying agreement).
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tampering because teams and agents will always attempt to find
ways around the restrictions, implementing these tactics would
hopefully at least curtail enough of the tampering to keep it from
spinning out of control.183
2. Time for Adam Silver to Take Matters into His Own Hands?
While the gradual move towards stricter enforcement repre-
sents a best case scenario for the League, Adam Silver may need to
prepare for the worst if he truly wants to solve the problem of
player tampering.184  Even though some owners would likely sup-
port Silver’s decision, other disgruntled owners and players may
make it a point of emphasis to eliminate the provision in Article
35A that gives the Commissioner the authority to prevent tam-
pered-with players from signing with the offending team.185  If
enough of the owners and players agreed during their CBA negotia-
tions to remove that power from the list of possible sanctions under
35A, it would remove the protections of the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption.186  Without the backdrop of Williams and the nonstatutory
labor exemption, any actions the Commissioner takes to prevent
teams from signing players that have been tampered with will be
evaluated under the rule of reason.187  Even without Article 35A
expressly providing for the nullification of contracts reached by ille-
gal tampering, the Commissioner still is provided the broad power
to declare void transactions as he sees fit under Article 24(i)(i).188
Under that provision, Silver would still have the discretion to pre-
vent players from signing with a team when there is evidence of
illegal contact.189
183. See Jaynes, supra note 12 (explaining why current penalties are not suc- R
ceeding in solving issue and that harsher penalties have been successful in past).
184. See Sampson, supra note 144 (stating that tampering is serious problem R
that Adam Silver and League must address).
185. See Bucher, supra note 1 (showing anger felt by several executives around R
League at investigation into Lakers tampering during Paul George incident).
186. For further discussion of the permissibility of anti-tampering provisions,
see supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
187. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (pro-
viding rule of reason standard and defining its applicability).
188. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
supra note 52, at art. 24(i)(i) (“The Commissioner shall have the power to declare R
null and void any Player transaction made by and between Members of the Associa-
tion or by and between Members of the Association and any organization outside
of the Association.”).
189. See id. (allowing Commissioner to void any transaction made by any
team).
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As controversial as it would be, there is recent precedent in the
NBA where the Commissioner voided a transaction under Article
24(i)(i): the infamous Chris Paul trade to the Lakers that David
Stern voided in 2011.190  Had the trade gone through, it would have
drastically altered the balance of power in the NBA and signifi-
cantly benefitted the Lakers.191  Several factors were involved in the
Leagues decision, including the unique circumstance of the NBA
temporarily owning the Hornets at the time, but a major concern
was preventing a trade that would alter the League’s competitive
balance.192
If the Commissioner began strategically nullifying mutually
agreed upon contracts to prevent an imbalance resulting from tam-
pering, such tactics would pose a more serious question of legiti-
macy under the rule of reason than simply prohibiting teams from
negotiating with players on other teams.193  The key question for
rule of reason analysis in this situation would be: does such a tactic
“suppress” or “destroy” competition?194  Here, the purpose remains
the same: to maintain a competitive balance of power throughout
the League by preventing better positioned teams from poaching
players from smaller market franchises through illegal recruiting
tactics.195
Opponents of this enforcement strategy would have to show
that, in light of nature of the business and the reasons justifying it,
the restriction is “significantly anticompetitive in purpose or ef-
fect.”196  This anticompetitive purpose or effect would then be bal-
anced against any pro-competitive purposes to determine if there is
190. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Rejects Trade Sending Paul to Lakers, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/sports/basketball/paul-
set-to-join-lakers-as-part-of-3-team-deal.html [https://perma.cc/E3U7-UQ45] (not-
ing Hornets and Lakers had trade in place that would have sent Chris Paul to Los
Angeles, but David Stern rejected trade).
191. See id. (quoting letter by Cleveland Cavaliers owner Dan Gilbert where he
wrote: “I cannot remember ever seeing a trade where a team got by far the best
player in the trade and saved over $40 million in the process”).
192. See id. (noting that Lakers had won five championships in previous dec-
ade and citing “basketball reasons” as main factor in nullifying trade).
193. See O’Connor, supra note 139 (saying taking David Stern’s approach of R
voiding contracts is “last thing Adam Silver should do”).
194. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (defin-
ing rule of reason as permitting regulations in restraint of trade as long as restric-
tion does not suppress or destroy competition).
195. See Andrade, supra note 11 (explaining interest that professional sports R
leagues have in preventing teams from luring players under contract with different
team through use of anti-tampering provisions).
196. See Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (set-
ting parameters for rule of reason analysis).
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a “net effect” of suppressing competition.197  Undoubtedly, there
are anticompetitive effects to this plan, as it is a clear restriction on
the player-service market.198  This restraint must be measured
against the many pro-competitive effects of maintaining a balance
of power throughout the League.199  Whereas the affect of nullify-
ing a transaction resulting from tampering would only have a re-
strictive effect on the individual violating team or player, the pro-
competitive benefits of preventing tampering protects the level of
competition throughout the entirety of the League.200  Because
each individual team is a separate entity pursuing its own economic
success, which directly corresponds to its performance and popular-
ity on the court, there is a strong interest in taking action to keep
the level of competition as balanced as possible.201
Arguments exist on both sides regarding the necessity of anti-
tampering provisions.202 However, due to the unique nature and
interdependence of sports leagues, trade restraints in the context of
sports leagues have typically been given greater leniency for poten-
tially antitrust actions than in other realms.203  Even regulations
that would likely be impermissible in other areas may be found to
be reasonable when applied to sports leagues due to the nature of
197. See id.  In its discussion on the parameters of the rule of reason analysis,
the court also provided:
If, on analysis, the restraint is found to have legitimate business purposes
whose realization serves to promote competition, the “anticompetitive
evils” of the challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its
“procompetitive virtues” to ascertain whether the former outweigh the
latter.  A restraint is unreasonable if it has the “net effect” of substantially
impeding competition.
Id. (citing Milton Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented
Supreme Court Term 1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 983 (1977)).
198. See id. at 1185 (conducting same analysis as applied to legitimacy of
player drafts).
199. For further discussion of pro-competitive justifications, see supra notes
11–18 and accompanying text (detailing need and justification for anti-tampering R
rules in professional sports which serve to promote competition within League).
200. For further discussion of effects of these provisions, see supra notes
11–18 and accompanying text (explaining how such provisions guard against small R
percentage of teams predominating over control of majority of top players).
201. For further discussion of each team as a separate entity for antitrust anal-
ysis purposes, see supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. R
202. See Sampson, supra note 144 (noting different options that League can R
take in response to player tampering issue).
203. See Tim Hance, Threading American Needle: Defining a Narrow Relevant Mar-
ket for Rule of Reason Analysis in Sports Antitrust Cases, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 247,
258 (2011) (“Rules involving limitations on competition for players and sharing
revenue between rival clubs, as well as restrictions on entry into the league joint
venture, on the sale of broadcast rights, and on the internal business structure of
member clubs, are all tolerated unless demonstrably unreasonable in the sports
context.”).
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the industry.204  Further, the rule of reason requires courts to ex-
amine the “degree of collusion” associated with the restraint as well
as the rationale and impact.205
Typically, courts find that joint ventures satisfy the rule of rea-
son because of their positive effect on consumers.206  This determi-
nation is made by weighing the pro-competitive and
anticompetitive values of the restriction to determine whether the
overall impact is beneficial to trade.207  To demonstrate that its ac-
tions promote an efficiency in the League that would otherwise not
exist, the NBA will point to the uneven playing field that would
result from allowing unrestricted access to players contracted to
other teams.208  Conversely, opponents would argue these efficien-
cies are outweighed by the fact that this strategy of enforcement
takes away independent decision making of the individual players
and teams.209  Considering the level of deference courts have given
to joint ventures under the rule of reason analysis, especially in re-
gards to sports leagues, the NBA would likely prevail due to the
collective positive impact such actions would have on the competi-
tive balance throughout the League.210
204. See Stephen F. Ross, & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League
Sports, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (“[T]he particular interdependence that
sports teams have with other economically separate firms within the same league
has led courts to be much more permissive in their antitrust scrutiny of trade re-
straints among members of sports leagues than in the case of most businesses.”).
205. See McCann, supra note 44, at 737 (stating that fact-intensive inquiry is R
required to balance relevant factors for and against restriction).
206. See id. at 738 (“Courts usually have found joint ventures to satisfy rule of
reason analysis on the basis that rather than harming consumers’ interests, joint
ventures often provide consumers with new product offerings that otherwise would
not have been produced or would not have been produced as efficiently.”)
207. See Hance, supra note 203, at 252–53 (explaining that anticompetitive R
agreements are only illegal via rule of reason under Sherman Act when anticompe-
titive effects outweigh procompetitive impact); see also See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (stating that when restraints are essen-
tial for a product to exist, agreements are likely to survive the rule of reason);
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (holding economically integrated joint
ventures are not barred from setting prices at which to sell products under Sher-
man Act); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colombia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979)
(holding that joint ventures and other similar agreements are not illegal when they
are necessary to market).
208. See Andrade, supra note 11 (explaining problematic realities that can R
take shape in absence of anti-tampering guidelines).
209. See McCann, supra note 44, at 738 (“In applying rule of reason to a joint R
venture, courts typically assess the extent to which the joint venture deprives the
marketplace of the independent decisionmaking normally demanded by competi-
tion and, conversely, the extent to which the joint venture improves market
efficiencies.”).
210. See id. at 737 (noting rule of reason analysis tends to favor professional
sports league defendants).
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3. Learning from Other Leagues?
Tampering exists in every sport and anti-tampering rules are in
place in all of the major sports leagues, but it appears to be a prob-
lem that is most prevalent in the NBA.211  The NBA may be better
served by following the examples set by other leagues that have
been more effective at deterring illegal recruiting.212  While the
NBA has shied away from imposing strict penalties and removing
draft picks, other leagues such as the NFL have effectively done so
to prevent teams from tampering with other players.213  For exam-
ple, in 2016, the NFL fined the Kansas City Chiefs $350,000 and
forfeited a future third and sixth round pick in upcoming drafts
due to the team’s illegal contact with Jeremy Maclin outside of the
league’s legal free agency window.214  Across the ocean, the English
Premier League (“EPL”), the biggest football (soccer) league in the
world, has been able to dissuade tampering by the mere threat of
penalties.215  Southampton FC complained to the EPL about Liver-
pool’s alleged tampering (called “tapping up” in England) of de-
fender Virgil van Dijk.216  Though no allegations were proven, the
complaint was enough of a deterrent to make Liverpool issue an
apology and withdraw its interest in Dijk in order to avoid league
sanctions.217  If the NBA wants to be more effective at preventing
player tampering, a necessary step may be to follow the example of
211. For further discussion of how tampering has become a systemic problem
in the NBA, see supra note 138–141 and accompanying text; see also Sheryl Ring, R
Aaron Judge, Manny Machado, and the Law of Tampering, FANGRAPHS (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/aaron-judge-manny-machado-and-the-law-of-
tampering/ [https://perma.cc/24AN-663B] (noting tampering is more common
in basketball than other sports).
212. See John Breech, NFL Hammers Chiefs for Tampering with Huge Fine, Loss of
Two Draft Picks, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/
nfl-hammers-chiefs-for-tampering-with-huge-fine-loss-of-two-draft-picks/ (showing
enforcement examples in NFL); see also Sean O’Toole, Tapping-Up (Tampering) of
Sports Players: How the NBA Rules Compare to the English Premier League, LAWINSPORTS
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/item/tapping-up-tam-
pering-of-sports-players-how-the-nba-rules-compare-to-the-english-premier-league
[https://perma.cc/8SNB-GYQF] (comparing NBA to English Premier League).
213. See Breech, supra note 212 (imposing strict penalty on Kansas City Chiefs R
for player tampering).
214. See id. (quoting NFL executive Vice President as saying “[t]he discipline
should be sufficient both to deter future violations and encourage cooperation in
future investigations”).
215. See O’Toole, supra note 212 (detailing recent tampering case of Virgil R
van Dijk).
216. See id. (alleging Liverpool manager illegally contacted Dijk who was inter-
ested in signing with team).
217. See id. (“Liverpool FC’s apology came in the wake of an EPL investiga-
tion; it clearly took the matter seriously enough to back down.  It is believed that
Liverpool has escaped punishment.”).
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these other leagues and issue punishments that truly deter
tampering.218
VI. THE BALL IS IN THE NBA’S COURT
Tampering has been a concern in sports dating back as long as
professional leagues have existed, and the NBA is reaching a point
where it must change the way it addresses it if it wants to curtail the
tampering issue before it is too late.219  Anti-tampering rules techni-
cally meet the criteria for traditional antitrust violations under the
Sherman Act.220  However, the rule of reason and the nonstatutory
labor exemption carve out avenues for its legitimacy due to the
unique necessity for competitive parity in sports leagues and the
longstanding validity of collective bargaining as a tool in labor ne-
gotiations.221  Despite the NBA’s legal authority to regulate tamper-
ing and the rules it has in place in the NBA Constitution, tampering
is a bigger issue than ever in today’s NBA.222  One of the biggest
catalysts for the rise in player tampering is the failure of Adam Sil-
ver and the League to adequately enforce the safeguards the
League has in place to discourage tampering, opting instead for
minor penalties that amount to a mere slap on the wrist in the
grand scheme of things, or worse yet, ignoring the problem
altogether.223
While there are certainly risks involved, and while some pro-
posed solutions may seem like drastic measures, the NBA must ad-
dress the issue of player tampering.224 The concern surrounding
player tampering in the NBA is reaching an all time high, and it is
the inaction of Commissioner Silver and Commissioner Stern
218. For further discussion of possible enforcement strategies the League
could employ to lessen tampering, see supra notes 178–183 and accompanying R
text.
219. See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 2 (tracing history of tampering from R
1800s to modern day).
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (making it illegal for actors to conspire to restrict
trade).
221. For further discussion of the relevance of rule of reason and nonstatu-
tory labor exemption to antitrust law in sports leagues, see supra notes 52–56 and R
accompanying text and supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. R
222. For further discussion of the heightened regularity of tampering in NBA
and its impact on League, see supra note 83 and accompanying text. R
223. For further discussion of the inconsistency between League’s public
stance regarding player tampering compared to actual steps taken to find solutions
to problem, see supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. R
224. For further discussion of the necessity of League action to resolve tam-
pering issue in the NBA, see supra note 184 and accompanying text. R
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before him that have allowed the tension to build.225  Due to the
intense and delicate nature of the predicament, any enforcement
would need to be gradual and applied impartially and consistently
throughout the League.226  Player tampering can have a devastating
effect on the competitive balance of a professional sports league.227
In the NBA particularly, the reliance on illegal player tampering
has been entrenched throughout the foundation of the League.228
Further, new technology and closer player relationships have
made the possibility of player-to-player tampering more accessible
and prevalent in the modern era of the NBA.229  The NBA has poli-
cies regulating tampering in place, but these guidelines have been
ineffective due to lack of enforcement, which is a problem that the
League needs to correct.230  As it currently stands, the NBA would
be well within its legal rights to enforce stricter penalties for tam-
pering violations due to the nonstatutory labor exemption of anti-
trust laws.231  Moreover, even without the protection of the
nonstatutory labor exemption, anti-tampering measures would
likely not violate antitrust laws under the rule of reason analysis.232
To take control of its tampering problem, the NBA needs to
start issuing stricter penalties, including harsher fines, suspensions
of violating players and executives, forfeiture of draft picks, and
nullification of contracts derived from illegal tampering.233  En-
225. For further discussion of the lack of enforcement by the League as a
driving force in rise of player tampering, see supra notes 165–168 and accompany- R
ing text.
226. See Sampson, supra note 144 (comparing situation to that of controversy R
surrounding NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and his perceived “arbitrary disci-
plinary decisions”).
227. See Andrade, supra note 11 (demonstrating need for anti-tampering rules R
in professional sports).
228. See Bucher, supra note 1 (noting that tampering has become such com- R
monplace in NBA that every GM takes part in some manner and most transactions
are result of tampering).
229. For further discussion of the increasing role that social media and inter-
personal relationships between players on different teams has had on player tam-
pering, see supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text. R
230. See Sampson, supra note 144 (discussing need for NBA to quickly resolve R
tampering problem).
231. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 691 (holding no antitrust violation for good faith
collective bargaining agreements).
232. See McCann, supra note 44, at 737 (“Courts usually have found joint ven- R
tures to satisfy rule of reason analysis on the basis that rather than harming con-
sumers’ interests, joint ventures often provide consumers with new product
offerings that otherwise would not have been produced or would not have been
produced as efficiently.”).
233. For further discussion of potential solutions for League to limit tamper-
ing, see supra notes 179–183 and accompanying text. R
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forcement strategies such as these have proven effective in other
professional leagues, and would very likely be successful in the NBA
as well.234  Ultimately, the law is in the NBA’s favor regarding en-
forcement of its anti-tampering policy, and if the League is serious
about solving its player tampering problem, the ball is in Adam Sil-
ver’s court.235
Colin Rizzo*
234. For further discussion of NBA’s enforcement of tampering violations
compared with other sports leagues’ enforcement, see supra notes 211–218 and R
accompanying text.
235. For further discussion of how antitrust laws cannot prevent League from
addressing its tampering problem, see supra note 63 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. in Political Science, Journalism & Media Studies, Rutgers University,
2017.
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